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1962/10/28

[REDACTED]

-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

BELGIAN OPENED QUESTIONING BY ASKING WHETHER PRESIDENT HAD FLATLY REJECTED CUBAN-TURKISH DEAL WITHOUT LEAVING DOOR OPEN FOR SOME LATER NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION AND STUDY WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, IT AGREED US POSITION CALLED FOR LIQUIDATION OFFENSIVE MISSILE BASES CUBA BEFORE ANY OTHER MATTERS COULD BE DISCUSSED OR NEGOTIATED WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE GENERAL SPHERE OF DISARMAMENT.

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UK THEN GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF HOME TALK OCTOBER 25 WITH SOVIET CHARGE IN WHICH LATTER EXPRESSED HOPE UK WOULD USE INFLUENCE PREVENT MATTERS GOING OVER BRINK, TO WHICH HOME REPLIED SOVIET ACTION IN CUBA HAD UPSET BALANCE AND THIS MUST BE REDRESSED, AND STATED IN REPLY TO SOVIET QUESTION REGARDING QUARANTINE THAT ANY COUNTRY HAD THE RIGHT TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE AS BEST IT SAW FIT. HOME ADDED IN VIEW OF THIS OBVIOUS POWER PLAY IN CUBA, DESPITE ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY, IT MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE UK TO WORK WITH SOVIET UNION WHEN THEY DID NOT TELL THE TRUTH.

(b)(1)
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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] BELGIAN

[REDACTED]

-3- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

BELGIAN REITERATED FIRST INGREDIENT WAS TO GET RID OF THE WEAPONS IN CUBA, AFTER WHICH IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE AND WORK OUT OTHER ARRANGEMENTS IN DISARMAMENT AS WELL AS IN OTHER FIELDS IN ORDER TO LESSEN TENSION IF POSSIBLE AND PUT NATO IN BEST DEFENSIVE POSITION. HE IMPLIED WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS HE HAD IN MIND WORKING OUT SOME ARRANGEMENT TO REPLACE JUPITERS BY MORE EFFECTIVE WEAPONS. (HE HAD VOLUNTEERED RPT VOLUNTEERED TO ME PREVIOUSLY THAT HE HAD IN MIND THE DESIRABILITY OF SETTING UP A NATO MULTILATERAL FORCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN TO REPLACE OBSOLETE JUPITERS IN BOTH TURKEY AND ITALY.) US ASSURED BELGIUM THAT WE NOT OPPOSED TO NEGOTIATIONS OR ARRANGEMENTS IN OTHER FIELDS AS WELL AS DISARMAMENT, AND PARTICULARLY NOT OPPOSED TO STRENGTHEN NATO DEFENSES PROVIDED CUBAN MATTER SETTLED SATISFACTORILY.

NORWAY STATED HIS GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE UNITED STATES POSITION RE CUBA GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY THAT WE MUST GET RID OF THE WEAPONS BEFORE ANY OTHER SETTLEMENT OR ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE. HE ADDED HOWEVER IT WAS GRATIFYING TO LEARN THAT US DID NOT OPPOSE NEGOTIATIONS ONCE THREAT AND BLACKMAIL HAD CEASED. UNDER INSTRUCTIONS HE URGED THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO CONTINUE DIPLOMATIC ACTION AND AVOID IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE DIRECT ACTION BY USE OF FORCE WHICH MIGHT MEAN THAT MATTERS WOULD GET COMPLETELY OUT OF HAND.

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TURKEY HAD NO DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS BUT COULD DRAW ON HIS GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO STATE THAT HE WAS SURE HIS GOVT WOULD AGREE WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH FIRM STAND TAKEN BY PRESIDENT TO TURN DOWN JUPITER DEAL. HE ADDED THAT IT CAN BE HELD THAT THE JUPITERS ARE OBSOLETE, ARE LIGHTNING RODS FOR ATTACK AND NOT TOO EFFECTIVE FOR DEFENSE OF TURKEY AND NATO IN GENERAL, BUT REGARDLESS OF THEIR EFFICACY THEY SHOULD NOT BE REMOVED UNDER THREAT OR AS PART OF ANY DEAL. ONCE CUBAN MATTER HAS BEEN SETTLED

[REDACTED]

NATO EXPERTS

[REDACTED]

-4- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

NATO EXPERTS MIGHT TALK ABOUT WHETHER ADVISABLE REMOVE JUPITERS AND HOW THEY MIGHT BE REPLACED BY OTHER DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. BUT STRONGLY EMPHASIZED NO THOUGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO SUCH SUGGESTION UNTIL CUBAN SITUATION SETTLED AND KHRUSHCHEV'S BLACKMAIL THREAT NO LONGER EXISTED. HE ADDED WHILE HE SURE HIS GOVT DESIRED EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS THEY SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE IN ANY WAY ANYTHING THAT MIGHT LOOK LIKE APPEASEMENT.

AFTER PORTUGAL HAD MADE A STATEMENT INDICATING SOLIDARITY WITH US, THE DANE STATED THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS HE SURE HIS GOVERNMENT TOOK SIMILAR POSITION TO THAT OF NORWAY AND UNDERLINED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD OF COURSE, DO EVERYTHING TO UNDERLINE THE DETERRENT. HE ADDED DETERRENT MEANS TO AVOID WAR, AND THEREFORE HOPED THAT EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO PREVENT HOSTILITIES FROM BREAKING OUT, SINCE HE FEARED WEST NOT NOW READY FOR MAJOR MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. DANE THEN ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE AS TO STATE OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN PINPOINT BOMBING OF ACTUAL SOVIET BASES IN CUBA AND ACTUAL INVASION OF ISLAND TO LIQUIDATE THESE BASES. NO ONE TRIED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTION.

(b)(1)

FINLETTER

MJA

Note: Advance copy to SS, 10/28/62, 10 PM, JAW.

[REDACTED]

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

52

Action
SS

Info

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11)

Control: 19528
Rec'd: OCTOBER 28, 1962
5:44 PM

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NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT, ALL OTHERS FOR INFORMATION

REFERENCE: DEPCIRTELS 744 778 AND TOPOLS 574 578

UK THEN STATED HAD RECEIVED NEW MESSAGES WHICH CONTAINED HIS GOVT'S EVALUATION SOVIET MOVES AND UK AMB ROBERTS' COMMENTS ON UK EVALUATION WHICH MASON PROCEEDED TO READ TO COUNCIL. (ASSUME DEPARTMENT HAS BOTH) PRESUMABLY THOSE REFERRED TO IN TOPOL 581).

GERMANY, AGAIN EXPRESSING FULL SOLIDARITY WITH US ACTION, EXPRESSED FEAR THAT CUBA AND BERLIN MIGHT BE MORE FIRMLY LINKED IN NEAR FUTURE. THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE SLOW-DOWN IN CIVILIAN TRAFFIC TO BERLIN, BUT WHETHER THIS DELIBERATE AND FULLY CONNECTED WITH CUBA NOT CLEAR. IN ANY EVENT, HE URGED THAT NO MATTER WHAT SMALL OR LARGE HARRASSMENTS MIGHT TAKE PLACE, THEY SHOULD BE RESISTED MOST FIRMLY UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES UNTIL CUBAN MATTER SETTLED. (b)

GREEK THEN MADE STRONG STATEMENT FAVORING US ACTION UNDERLINING JUPITERS ARE DEFENSIVE WEAPONS FOR THE DEFENSE NOT JUST OF TURKEY BUT FOR ALL OF NATO, AND THEREFORE (A) WE SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE ON ANY POINTS UNTIL SOVIET MISSILES CUBA COMPLETELY LIQUIDATED, AND (B) PRESIDENT HAS BEEN COMPLETELY RIGHT IN TURNING DOWN ANY DEAL. GREEK THEN OUTLINED CONVERSATION AVEROFF AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR ATHENS IN WHICH LATTER TOOK GREEKS TO TASK FOR FIRM PRO-US POSITIC.

WHICH
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-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

WHICH COULD BE CATASTROPHIC FOR GREECE IF PERSISTED IN. AVEROFF REPLIED FIRMLY GREECE WOULD STAND BY HER ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS AND HER PRINCIPLES. GREEK PERMREP AGAIN URGED NATO SOLIDARITY STATEMENT RE CUBA.

FRANCE (AFTER FIRST HAVING TOLD US HE WAS CHECKING WITH QUAI) STATED FRANCE BACKS US MOVES 100 PERCENT, PARTICULARLY ON PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL MAKE ANY DEAL RE JUPITERS. HE POINTED OUT IF DEAL MADE ON JUPITERS SOVIETS MIGHT ATTEMPT ESTABLISH BASES OTHER COUNTRIES AND THEN FORCE DEALS FOR LIQUIDATION OTHER NATO INSTALLATIONS WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY COMPLETELY BREAK UP ALLIANCE. HE ADDED WHILE HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT ALWAYS FULLY SHARE OUR ACTIONS IN TRYING TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH SOVIETS, HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT WE WERE RIGHT IN REFUSING NEGOTIATE NOW UNTIL CUBAN MISSILE BASES FULLY LIQUIDATED. PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT IF CUBAN MATTER COULD BE SATISFACTORILY LIQUIDATED AND IT WOULD BE CLEAR TO KHRUSHCHEV HIS COUP HAD FAILED AND WEST WAS SOLIDLY AGAINST HIS MOVES OF THIS KIND, IT MIGHT THEN BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO START NEGOTIATING WITH A SOMEWHAT CHASTENED KHRUSHCHEV.

ITALY, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, STATED HE WAS CERTAIN HIS GOVT WOULD AGREE WITH PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL ANY DEAL RE JUPITERS. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER THIS NAC MEETING WAS FOR INFORMATION OR CONSULTATION, SINCE US STATEMENTS HAD EMPHASIZED WE HOPED TO SETTLE CUBAN MATTER IN CONTEXT WESTERN HEMISPHERE. US REPLIED WHILE THE PROBLEM WAS BASICALLY ONE OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE, AND THEREFORE WE WOULD RELY BASICALLY ON OUR OAS ALLIES, IT CLEAR ANY ACTION IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD INVOLVING ONE NATO PARTNER DOES AFFECT ENTIRE NATO ALLIANCE. PARTICULARLY TRUE NOW THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD LINKED CUBA AND JUPITERS IN TURKEY. THEREFORE, THE US NOT ONLY WISHED TO GIVE ALLIANCE INFORMATION REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS, BUT DESIRED TO HAVE SUPPORT OF THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN, PARTICULARLY IN TURNING DOWN JUPITER DEAL.

BELGIAN INTERJECTED THAT HIS GOVT DEFINITELY DESIRED THAT CONSULTATIONS IN FULLEST MEANING OF THE WORD SHOULD CONTINUE

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(DURING)

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-3- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

DURING THIS ENTIRE CRISIS BECAUSE DEVELOPMENTS COULD TAKE PLACE WHICH VITALLY AFFECT ENTIRE ALLIANCE.

DUTCH, REITERATING HIS GOVT'S STRONG APPROVAL US ACTION CUBA, STATED THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS, HE SURE HIS GOVT WOULD BACK OUR ACTION ON JUPITERS, SINCE THESE ARE NATO WEAPONS AND ANY ACTION TO REMOVE THEM, REPLACE THEM, OR MAKE ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENTS TO COVER THE SAME DEFENSE NEEDS MUST BE PASSED BY NATO AS A WHOLE. HE THEN STATED HE IMPRESSED BY NORWEGIAN COLLEAGUE'S STATEMENT AND HOPED ALL EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO AVOID USE OF FORCE. HOWEVER, SINCE IT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE AVOID USE OF FORCE, NAC CONSULTATIONS MUST TAKE PLACE CONTINUOUSLY. DUTCH THEN EMPHASIZED WHILE HE AGREED WITH OTHERS WE MIGHT INTENSIFY DISCUSSIONS DISARMAMENT AFTER CUBAN MATTER SETTLED, SHOULD NOT SHOW MORE DESIRE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN DISARMAMENT AFTER CUBA SETTLED BECAUSE THIS WOULD GIVE IMPRESSION TO KHRUSHCHEV HE HAD MADE GAIN BY CREATING CUBAN CRISIS.

ICELAND SAID HE HAD NO DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS IN REGARD TO THIS METING, BUT HIS FONOFF HAD INFORMED THE UNITED STATES GOVT IT BACKED FULLY US ACTION RE CUBA. LUXEMBOURG WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT REITERATED HIS GOVT'S FIRM PUBLIC STAND FOR US.

UK STATED HIS UNDERSTANDING TODAY'S MEETING WAS (1) TO GET CONSENSUS COUNCIL ON ACTION TAKEN BY US ON CUBA PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO JUPITERS; (2) TO KEEP NAC INFORMED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF DEVELOPMENTS, AND (3) TO DO AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO FORECAST FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN ORDER THAT NAC MIGHT BE PREPARED FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES.

BELGIAN THEN BROUGHT UP FACT THAT THERE WERE MANY RUMORS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PLANNING UNILATERAL BOMBARDMENT OF CUBA WITHOUT ANY WARNING, CONSULTATION WITH NAC OR WITH UN. US REPLIED COULD NOT GIVE AN ANSWER TO THIS MATTER, SINCE SUCH DECISION MIGHT BE GOVERNED PRIMARILY BY MILITARY QUESTION, BUT STATED WE WOULD TRY TO CONSULT WHENEVER WE COULD, BUT ONE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THIS WOULD ALWAYS BE POSSIBLE.

TURK

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-4- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION II OF II), FROM
PARIS

TURK THEN STATED HAD JUST RECEIVED TELEGRAM GIVING PRELIMINARY REACTION WHY TURKISH GOVT HAD NOT PUBLICLY REPLIED TO KHRUSHCHEV JUPITER DEAL SUGGESTION: (1) TURKS HAD ONLY HEARD OF DEAL THROUGH PRESS, (2) SOVIET GOVT HAD NOT ADDRESSED THEM DIRECTLY, AND (3) THEY DID NOT WISH TO REACT IN ANY WAY TO IMPEDE WHATEVER ACTION PRESIDENT DESIRED TAKE IN THIS MATTER, SINCE THEY DID NOT WISH TO GIVE ANY IMPRESSION THEY WERE A SATELLITE. HE ADDED THAT THIS MESSAGE INDICATED HE WOULD BE RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS SHORTLY AND WOULD BE ASKED TO CALL A SPECIAL NAC MEETING. GREEK THEN INTERJECTED TO STATE THAT THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED INFORMATION OF IMPORTANT MILITARY BUILD-UP IN BULGARIA AND THOUGHT THIS SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COUNCIL BECAUSE IT MIGHT INDICATE A PLAN OF SOVIET BLOC DIVERSION.


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ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:

1. THERE WAS A FULL NAC CONSENSUS ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET MENACE AND THREAT BY PLACING OFFENSIVE MISSILES CUBA AND FULL SUPPORT FOR US POSITION.
2. ALL AGREED IT MOST HELPFUL HAVE FULL OAS SUPPORT FOR US ACTION.
3. ALL AGREED THAT NO NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL CUBAN BASES FULLY LIQUIDATED.
4. ALL ARE IN ABSOLUTE AGREEMENT AGAINST ANY TRADE RE JUPITER.
5. ALL AGREED THAT SOVIET UNION MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE MUST DROP CUBAN MISSILE VENTURE BEFORE WEST CAN START MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE IF CUBA SETTLED.
6. ALL NAC MEMBERS WISHED TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS CONTACT AND MEET AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ASSURE COLLECTIVE BACKING OF ALL NAC MEMBERS FOR ACTION TAKEN IN THIS CRISIS.

WHILE

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-5- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM
PARIS

WHILE COLONNA DID NOT EMPHASIZE IN HIS SUMMARY, IT WAS MOST
CLEAR DESIRE OF PERMREPS THAT ONCE CUBA PROBLEM SETTLED
SATISFACTORILY, THERE SHOULD BE FIRM EFFORTS BY WEST FOR
GENERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON ALL MAJOR PROBLEMS.

FINLETTER

MJA

Note: Advance copy to SS, 10/28/62, 10 PM, JAW